Roads

Posted: July 22, 2014 in Poetry
Tags: ,

 

And today I drove

On roads

That I have no

Reason to

Drive on roads

That I used to walk as a

Child

The spectres of memories

Haunting

The recesses of alleyways

Filled with the smells of dinner

Cooking and the miasma of

Trash cans under the summer sun

Roads filled with

Crowing and ringing laughter

Echoing through the ephemeral

Veil of time

Roads

Filled with years of memories

That have eroded

Beaten relentlessly by the wash of

Days and months and years and years and

Years go by

Without so much notice

On these roads where I used

To live and play

Roads where the wraith

Of nostalgia touches us

With a pleasant warmth

Of reminiscences

That leaves us cold to today

Longing for roads that no

Longer exist

Roads that are more a story

Told

Than a memory real—

Living

On these roads that I

Drive

And not walk any longer

All are the

Ghosts of a youth [nearly]

Forgotten

I, Once, a Day (A Love Pome)

Posted: January 11, 2014 in Poetry
Tags:

The roads I walk

Pounded hard by rubber and steel

Ashen and cold

Unforgiven cracks covered up by seems flawed—

Speechless I in a daze

Walk forward

A day once I could—

The trees here with a fresh snowfall

Are beautiful

So pristine and untouched

Ageless

Timeless

Remembering thru their roots

Those who could still walk the path

Soft—

A day once I was

Inside me with love

Before now gone with bitter—

The wind knives

With unseen ice I have become

Cold the air frosts and chills

Inviting me a cigarette

The beat of a Drum different

Or a picture of a desert

Warmth—

Felt no longer

Numbness the only sensation

Fleeting dreams

A day once I would—

I have forgotten.

 

            In his article, “Moral Luck,[1]” Thomas Nagel claims that, intuitively, we believe one is not responsible, morally speaking, for those things that are beyond one’s control. One normally would not cast moral aspersions against one if their action resulted from, “a clear absence of control, produced by involuntary movement, physical force, or ignorance of the circumstances.”[2] For instance, if I am driving, and I am suddenly struck with a seizure, then one surely would not hold me morally responsible for any damages to people or property that would have resulted from the ensuing crash. One would claim that a great tragedy had happened, especially if a pedestrian or other motorist were seriously injured or killed, but one would not say that I did anything blameworthy.[3] This seems a basic and uncontroversial claim. However, if applied consistently, this condition of control seems to undermine all moral judgment. Nagel believes that when one looks closely enough, more and more seems to be beyond one’s control, so much so, that very little or nothing is actually under an agent’s control.[4] What Nagel claims then, is that we are morally assessed based upon what he calls moral luck. Moral luck covers those things that one is morally assessed for, yet remains primarily outside of one’s control.[5] Nagel identifies four distinctive types of moral luck, constitutive, circumstantial, causal, and consequential, which will be described in greater detail below.[6] However, to Nagel, this creates a paradox with our normal way of assessing moral culpability. If we cannot judge one for things that are beyond one’s control, and it seems as if almost everything is beyond the agent’s control, how can we assess moral praise or blame whatsoever? Herein, I shall discuss the significant aspects of this paradox, including the four types of moral luck Nagel identifies and the twofold nature of how Nagel believes we assign moral culpability. I will then argue that while this paradox seems to undermine normal moral assessme nt, that we can still find an agent praiseworthy or blameworthy regardless of the existence of moral luck.

            We morally appraise ourselves and others in a twofold way. The first is an external evaluation. This is an assessment of the state of affairs, that it is a good or bad thing that such-and-such happened, or that why so-and-so is the way s/he is. The second is an internal assessment. That so-and-so is a good or bad person based on what s/he did, that the agent should feel pride or shame due to his/her actions.[7]

            As stated above, though, it seems that our common sense moral judgments seem to include an exception for those acts that are beyond the agent’s control. This seems most natural in cases that include some kind of involuntary movement, coercion, or ignorance of the facts. This is what Nagel deems the condition of control, or control principle. Nagel asserts, though, upon closer inspection, that much of what an agent does is beyond the agent’s control. So if we apply the control principle consistently, almost nothing an agent does can be morally assessed. We can still make the claim that a situation is good or bad, but we cannot morally assess the actors involved, as it seems almost nothing is under the agent’s control. Yet, as Nagel asserts, we still make moral claims against the agent, and this is due to the agent’s moral luck. This is the source of the paradox.

            Nagel identifies four distinct types of moral luck, constitutive, circumstantial, causal, and consequential. Constitutive luck includes what composes one’s character traits. It covers what one’s inclinations are, how intelligent one is, etc. It seems to Nagel that most of what comprises constitutive luck is beyond what the agent can be said to control.[8] It is in many ways determined by genetics and environmental causes. These things affect at a very basic level my basic character traits and capabilities. How smart I am depends, to a large extent, on the genes donated to me by my parents. So, my capacity to learn is, mostly, beyond my control. The same can be said of my basic character traits that are socialized either from my home environment or from peer groups.[9]

            The second type of moral luck is circumstantial luck. This consists of the circumstances one is born into, or subsequently finds oneself in. This is highlighted by Nagel’s example of the Nazi sympathizer. It is by fate alone that in the one instance he is sent to Argentinaon business concerns and never rises in the Nazi regime, and then leads a relatively quiet life, or in the other that he is not, and is swept up in the Nazi party and then commits horrible acts.[10]

            Causal luck is the third type that Nagel points out. This is the luck of antecedent processes. This is the idea that every process, mechanical or moral, is the result of another process that came before it. How can one be blamed or praised for an act if it is just part of a larger causal chain that extends both backwards and forwards into eternity? Was it not then that the action was not a matter of the will of the agent, but just part of a deterministic set, and that it is just the actor’s luck, good or bad, that any specific action was undertaken in a certain way? This idea seems to attack the concept of free will most directly, as it assumes that our actions are predetermined by antecedent processes.

            The final type of moral luck Nagel identifies is consequential. This is the idea that one is lucky, good or bad, on how one’s actions turn out. This would be embodied in the case Nagel gives of the two potential murderers, where one succeeds, and the other fails due to some happenstance beyond his control.[11] If this, and the above conditions of moral luck hold true, then it seems that according to the condition of control, not very many of our actions can be assessed morally.

            While it is undeniable that some degree of chance plays a role in the life of an agent, particularly when and to whom the agent is born; it is my assertion that Nagel overstates the importance he gives to moral luck, insofar as it wholly, or nearly wholly, determines the entirety of an agent’s possible actions and his or her characteristics, and when taken with the control principle exempts the agent from moral assessment. While certain factors may set baselines for behavior, it is not clear that those factors are necessarily the primary causes of any agent action. The possible exceptions to this would be those things that remain under the strictest possible reading of the condition of control. It is my claim that while there are many things that are beyond the control of an agent, the agent is still responsible for his or her willful actions.[12] As such, one can be morally assessed for one’s role any event, and how that event turned out, in which one has performed a willful action, despite the fact that certain aspects of the event were beyond the direct control of the agent.

            Let us look at this will hold up against Nagel’s four types of moral luck. First let us address consequential luck by analyzing the case of Nagel’s two negligent drivers.[13] He asserts that we assess the driver that actually hits a child more harshly than we do one that did not hit a child. I do not disagree with him on this point. However, he goes on to say that it was only the first driver’s bad luck, and the second driver’s bad luck that the one hit the child and the other did not, so we cannot morally assess the first driver more harshly than the second. This I do not agree with. We find both drivers equally blameworthy for their negligent driving. In fact, in our every-day admonition of reckless or negligent driving, we often invoke the idea that the negligent driver could have hit an innocent pedestrian. That aspect of the possible outcome is built in to why we find reckless driving wrong in the first place. As the first driver actually hit a child, we make another moral judgment against him in light of the facts of the outcome.

            One could claim then that we should not blame the first driver more harshly than the second, or that we should blame the second driver as harshly as the first, as the end results were ultimately decided by luck. Granted, the first driver could not control the fact that the child had wandered into the road, but he could control his driving negligently. So we blame him for his role in the hitting of the child. Whatever the causal link to the antecedent processes, the driver still made, or believed himself to make, the decision to drive recklessly, and to this we hold him morally responsible for both the reckless driving and the outcome of the reckless driving, in the first case further moral blame against the driver, and in the second no further blame.

            Let us now turn to circumstantial luck. Again, this is an area that seems to be outside the realm of agent control, as illustrated by the Nazi sympathizers.[14] This case is very similar to the case of our drivers above. We judge the one that actually got caught up in the Nazi regime and performed atrocious acts more harshly than the one that had similar beliefs, but due to his transfer toArgentina for business reasons, did not. We find both their attitudes morally objectionable, but we find even more objectionable that the one acted upon them. Again, we use a two tiered moral assessment. One that finds them morally blameworthy for their attitudes, and another that covers what they actually do. It is not the case that we find the first one’s anti-Semitism more deplorable just because he acted upon his beliefs. We find both cases of anti-Semitism deplorable, and then make a second judgment against the one who actually acted upon it, even though it was only by luck that the second one was transferred out ofGermany before he could act upon his inclinations.

             How is it that we can make this judgment, even though it was only up to luck that the one remained inGermanyand the other did not? Again, we make moral assessments based on what an agent actually does, so long as it can be seen to be, or perceived to be an act of will of the agent. The second Nazi sympathizer may have even pursued the Nazi persecution even more fervently than the first had he stayed inGermany, but as he did not, we do not judge him as severely as the one who stayed and did. It still took a conscious act for the first to perpetrate his crimes, despite the factors that were outside of his control.

            Constitutive luck would seem to present a major problem to this view. How is it that one can be held responsible for traits that one inherits genetically from one’s parents, or are socialized into by one’s prevailing culture and peer group? These circumstances seem to be wholly out of the control of the agent. However, it seems more that these set baselines for behavior, and are very possibly not a primary cause of an agent’s actions or character traits.[15] The agent, themselves, after taking in information, decides, however passively, ultimately who they are. I will use an example from my personal life to illustrate this point. I have a twin brother. We grew up in the same household, mostly shared the same peer groups while growing up, and in general were exposed to many of the same ideas while growing up. We have similar personalities, insofar as our sense of humor and various other personality characteristics are concerned. However, we diverge in some very important aspects that are hard to explain under constitutive determinism. My brother tends to be religious and me not at all. He is politically conservative, while I am a liberal libertarian. I value intellectual pursuits more highly, while he values more mundane pursuits with more vigor.

            If environmental and/or genetic determinism were indeed as strong as Nagel claims them to be, what can explain these stark differences? It is true as well, that at one time I shared those same values. Could it be that I just had slightly different experiences that manifested itself in larger differences over time? As stated, I did share many of those same values, but I then went through a process of critically evaluating my values, and decided I was unhappy with them. No perceptible force outside myself caused me to do so; it was just a result of a process of self-evaluation that I initiated. I am therefore responsible for the beliefs and attitudes that I hold, and the actions that I effect out of those desires.

            The last form of moral luck needing to be addressed is that of causal luck. This seems to pose a problem as well. In fact, by its very definition, causal luck infers that events are the result of antecedent processes. While this may, or may not be true,[16] preceding events still may not be the primary cause of an agent’s acting one way instead of another. Antecedent processes may, however, restrict the set of perceived options to any given possible action, but it is still up to the agent to willfully act, even if the agent perceives that s/he has only one choice.

            But how can one be blamed or praised for an action that is part of a larger causal chain? An agent can still be blamed for their role in that causal chain, so long as one’s action in it resulted from a willful act. Let us return to our negligent driver. What if the driver had just gotten into a nasty break-up with his fiancée after catching her in bed with another man; so he storms out to his car and drives off not paying attention to basic rules of caution and safety, and then strikes a child with his car. Do we find his action any less reprehensible, even though the reason he was driving negligently was not entirely in his control, as he was upset after witnessing his fiancée with another man, and he perceived that his only option was to drive away as fast as he could? My answer is that we do not. Granted, we sympathize with him on some level, but he still did something wrong, and that wrong resulted in an even greater harm. Speeding off was not his only option. He could have waited in his car for some time until he regained his composure enough to drive safely. He could have run off on foot. He could have done any number of things. But what he did do, and that which we pass our judgment against him, is drive off carelessly and then hit a child. Even though the majority of the events were outside of his control, we still find him responsible for those things that he could control and decided to act upon.

            Thomas Nagel believes that given our common-sense way of moral assessment, we do not hold one accountable for those actions that are beyond one’s control. He goes on to claim that when applied consistently, given the seemingly deterministic nature of the world (humanity included) that very little, if anything, remains that can be morally assessed. He holds that this creates a paradox with our common sense morality. How can we pass moral judgments if almost nothing is under the control of the agent? He then asserts that we find moral blame and praise based upon one’s moral luck. He defines moral luck as when moral assessment is weighed even when most of one’s actions are beyond one’s control. He then identifies four types of moral luck, constitutive, circumstantial, causal, and consequential. I have then argued that despite the condition of control, and moral luck, that Nagel places too much emphasis on the deterministic nature of moral luck as a causative force upon an agent’s character, will, and actions. It is my belief that an agent is responsible for those things that are deemed a willful act by the agent, and the agent’s role in any causal chain in which the agent performed an act that is deemed willful.[17]


[2] Ibid. p. 442.

[3] This case would be particularly true if I had no history of epilepsy, or seizures in general. However, if I had a medical condition that caused me to have seizures and I did not take my prescribed medication, then one may find me blameworthy according to our common sense moral evaluations.

[4] Nagel. p. 443.

[5] Cohon, Rachel. “Handout on Nagel’s ‘Moral Luck.’”

[6] Nagel. p. 444.

[7] Nagel. p. 442, 451. Cohon. “Handout.”

[8] Nagel. p. 444

[9] Nagel. p. 447.  Nelkin, Dana K., “Moral Luck”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/moral-luck/&gt;.

[10] Nagel. p 442, 448

[11] Nagel. p 444, 445

[12] I am interpreting willful actions as those actions which the agent is the primary cause of, or believes himself to be the primary cause of.

[13] Nagel. p. 442, 445.

[14] Ibid. p. 442, 448.

[15] An exception to this would be cases where the is a clear genetic, or other, defect that manifests itself physically or mentally in the agent, such as Down Syndrome or Cerebral Palsy.

[16] It is possible that causation may not be deterministic, but probabilistic.

[17] It is an unstated premise in my argument that if determinism fails, and agent action is caused willfully in all circumstances, that the paradox does not exist at all, and moral luck is just a manifestation of the randomness of the universe.

Satan Rides the Bus

Posted: March 2, 2011 in Poetry
Tags:

Satan rides the
Bus every morning
Downtown
Where the ground is cracked
Neglected
He sits smoothly
In the blue seat
Dark shaded lenses
Tight pressed against his face
Shooting cold expressions
Of “Leave me alone.
I just want to
Read
My paper.”
Over the pot holed
Turbulence
And hissing of the brakes
His smiles tar
The air
With murder and
Rape—laughing
Satan rides the
Bus every morning
Downtown to where
The steeples that
Climb towards Heaven
With their golden crucifixions
Atop
Look like ejaculating phallic symbols
And the men are kept in seminaries (semenaries)
And the women in
Nunneries (noneries)
Is this a secret symbol
Of homosexuality? Male dominance?
And subjugation of women?
Or is my mind just
Wandering again?

Dawn Approaching

Posted: February 5, 2011 in Poetry
Tags:

The sign is illuminated
Like radio-active waste
Subtly calling
My attention
Is the traffic lite
Changing its shade
As if it thought
It were a chameleon
Quarter to 5 in the morning
And people outnumber
Squirrels scurrying on the street
Perfume calls a change
In the air
Sweet and overpowering
And somewhat sickening
Forces me outside to
The refuge of the fresh—
Polluted air and a cigarette
I sit here
Alone, stranded
Watching the parade of humanity
(If you want to call it that)
March in and out of
This Dunkin’ Donuts
24 hour service to the
Community of nitehawk coffee drinkers
Drunkards, bums, and the variegated bar hoppers
After last call
I can hear the neon hum
Of dawn approaching
Like it was a speeding
Big-rig on the desert highway
Yet another cop comes in
He’s a shady character
And looking at me
Cock-eyed and with suspicion
Go figure,
He orders two coffees
And a half-dozen Boston Crème donuts
The flashing of the lottery machine
Is slowly hypnotizing me
“Play Here!! Play Here!!”
“Jackpot $25 Million!! Jackpot $25 Million!!”
It rolls of its display
Cutting into me
Like a buzz-saw into
An ancient oak tree
Hereby destroying my self-worth
With the reminder of impoverishment
The sky changes from black to
Purple to
Blue
Creating and aura of excitement
To the newfound day
The morning air is sweet
Though tainted by the filling station’s
Fumes of excess petroleum
Processed by the God of Greed with Pegasus wings
And conveniently sold
As it were a necessity
KILL THAT FUCKING RADIO!
This is the sixth Hootie and
The fucking Blowfish song
I’ve heard in
A scant 3 hours
It’s driving me evermore
Insane than I already am
Suddenly! A pigeon!
Nah, I reckon a pigeon
That wants to me a pelican
Swoops from the sky
To fish the discarded remains
Of a donut
And sweeps back to the heavens
With its worldly
Treasure
Of grease
And sugar
Hey taxi—
If I give you a pubic hair
And piss in your cab
Will you take me home?—
Well, fuck you too
If I can’t catch a
Free ride by having the
Balls to say that
It just isn’t worth it
Guess what? C’mon take a guess
Sleep deprived delirium and
Caffeine poisoning just kicked in
And I’ve never felt better.

Generation Next/Something Better

Posted: February 3, 2011 in Poetry
Tags:

We are Generation Next
We have no identity
And don’t know what we
Stand for
We were raised by the
Almighty-new-God
Television
And had instilled
Within us
The ideals of mass media
Commercialism and consumerism
We are a generation
Alienated from ourselves
We are allowed to be
Ourselves only if it fits
Into the neatly packaged box
Sold at the Gap or
Some other mall store
And if we don’t
We’re likely to walk into
School with Tech-9’s and
Pipe bombs and take out
As many people as possible
Emulating our favorite
Movie/video game characters
And further alienating ourselves
We are Generation next
We have lost all
Hope and direction
And we don’t see any
Purposefulness in our lives
You used to be able to get
A factory job out of school
And make a living
Not so any more
Most of the factories have moved
To Mexico or a Third World country
Where they pay their workers
13 cents a day
And college…
Fuck college if you’re poor
And receive a substandard education
Due to a declining tax base
So schools can’t buy books
Or computers
Or teachers worth their weight
In salt
We are Generation Next
We have unwittingly taken
The motto of Nieztsche:
“Be hard” and “Kindness is a Weakness”
We have lost sight of goodness
And live lives of misery
We have turned to illicit drugs
And lurid sex to forget
Our pains
Only for it to cause more pain
Pop culture is more a reflection of this
Than its
Cause
It was all too willing
To sell us out
For a buck
And all it takes is
“A Dollar and a Dream”
But our dreams
Are too lithe
And lack true substance
We are Generation Next
And in the concrete jungle
We have reverted to
The “State of Nature”
Where might is right
And force the law
A perverse form of
Social Darwinism where
“Cash rules everything around me
C.R.E.A.M get the money
Dollar-dollar bill y’all”
It the motto
And I’ll kill you over
A wooden nickel
Is the attitude
How else are we to be?
We all know there’s
Something better than this
We just don’t know what.

            One of the most damaging rational arguments against the possibility of time travel, in particular time travel with backwards causation[1], is the “grandfather paradox.” To answer this, some have claimed that the paradox is just “telling inconsistent stories.” Herein, I shall briefly describe both the “grandfather paradox” and the “telling inconsistent stories” answer to the paradox. I will then give a critique of the “telling inconsistent stories” answer that claims that it restricts free will, reply to that criticism, and then give an assessment of the dispute.

            The “grandfather paradox” is a paradox concerning time travel where a time traveler, let us say myself, goes back in time, say to 1930, and I kill my grandfather before my mother is conceived. The paradox is this: if I kill my grandfather, then my mother never was born. If my mother was never born, then I would not exist. If I never exist, then I never go back in time to kill my grandfather. Therefore, my grandfather lives, and then I am born and can go back in time to kill my grandfather. This posits that in 1930 my grandfather both lives and dies.[2]

            An answer to this paradox is that it is simply telling inconsistent stories. What this means is that the paradox is attempting to invoke two sets of contradictory facts about 1930, namely one where my grandfather lives, and one where my I kill my grandfather. According to this view, a time-line, by definition, has a single history. It is necessarily self-consistent. In other words, there can only be one set of facts about 1930; the one where my grandfather lives and continues to live until the point where actually does/did die. Thus, to claim that my grandfather is both alive and dead in 1930 is pure nonsense, because in this time-line my grandfather did live through 1930 and long enough to conceive my mother.

            Those who advocate the grandfather paradox want to appeal to, intentionally or not, that there is one 1930 where my grandfather lives, and then there is a second 1930 when I go back in time to kill my grandfather. However, since time-lines must be self-consistent, when 1930 happened in the first and only instance, I was there and did not kill my grandfather. This says that I can affect the past, but not change it. This means that when I go to the past I cannot change anything, because my presence was always there. My being there, and any actions that I have done, has already been taken into account about the facts of 1930. This idea was brought up in the movie 12 Monkeys when Madeline Stowe’s character asks Bruce Willis’ why he does not try to stop the virus from being released, as opposed to just getting a sample of the non-mutated virus to create a vaccine from. She seemed nonplussed by his response of, “I can’t stop it. It’s already happened.”  

            The idea that I must always be in that version of 1930 is highlighted as well in, 12 Monkeys. In Bruce Willis’ character’s childhood memories at the airport on the day that the virus was released included the ado caused by his adult self trying to track down the virus. His memories included those of him as an adult. Again, the voicemail clues he followed to track down the virus were the very same clues he was leaving. This as well shows that one can affect the past, but not change it. 

            An argument often used to counter the “telling inconsistent stories” argument is that it constricts one’s range of actions and poses a limitation on free will.[3] Proponents of this view claim that if time travel is possible, then, if free will is to be maintained, then it must be possible that I can kill my grandfather. To say that I cannot kill my grandfather is to say that I do not actually have free will, as killing my grandfather is excluded from my possible actions, thereby saying that I cannot kill him, if not completely eliminating free will, severely limits it. It claims that accepting the premise of the “telling inconsistent stories” argument is a concession to, at the very least, a kind of limited determinism. If I cannot kill my grandfather, if Bruce Willis cannot stop the virus from being released, then we lack true independent agency to act as we wish. This argument has a certain intuitive appeal that seems to undermine the idea of free will.

            If we accept that a time-line must be self-consistent and necessarily has a self-similar history, then this argument is guilty of a variation on the fallacy of misplaced probability. The chance of me not killing my grandfather in 1930 is 1. It does not undermine free will that I cannot kill my grandfather in 1930, because when 1930 happened I was there and did not kill him. It is not so much that I cannot kill my grandfather, as it is that I did not kill my grandfather. I very well may have gone back to 1930 with every intention of killing my grandfather, but for whatever reasons, I chose not to, or was in some other way prevented from killing him. Foreknowledge of my actions, in this instance not killing my grandfather in 1930 from the perspective of someone in 2008, does not undermine free will. It just so happens to be the case that I did not kill my grandfather. It cannot happen any other way because it did not happen any other way; not that it did not happen any other way because it could not happen any other way.

            It is an underlying assumption, in both philosophy and science, that the universe, however conceived, is a rationally ordered thing; it follows certain rationally definable rules and laws. If this assumption is true, then, either instances of logical paradoxes are just impossible to produce in reality, or our underlying assumptions of the universe must be revised to reconcile with the paradox. One could reconcile our view of the universe with a “multiple worlds” postulation about the universe. This view however, side steps the question of backwards causation though, by claiming that the world/time-line affected was not the one in which I was born. That time-line remains unaffected, and another one where I kill my grandfather exists. However, if we would like to maintain the idea of backwards causation in time travel along a single time-line, then this consideration must be put aside.

            We now return back to our basic assumption of the world/universe being a rationally ordered thing. If this holds true, then it can be said that it is possible only to do that which is logically possible, and that logical paradoxes of this kind are just impossible to produce in reality. The “telling inconsistent stories” reply is consistent with only being able to do what is logically possible, and to a degree that is what its essential claim is. To attempt to do/say something that is a logical impossibility is just to attempt/do something that is just inconsistent with the way universe works. Without drastically redefining how the universe works, it reduces the paradox to nothing more than a fun, provocative thought experiment, and fodder for writers of science fiction.    


[1] Backwards causation states that effects can precede their causes.

[2] There is a secondary postulation here that my existence is not dependent upon who my biological parents are, that I exist independently from my particular biological parents.  However, this postulation goes beyond the scope of this essay and will not be addressed here.

[3] Many still hold this view even though it has been established that one can recreate a similar paradox independent of human action, such as the radio message paradox used in class.